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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cody Ryan Blake appeals from the district court's order denying his motion in limine.
Pursuant to the motion, Mr. Blake moved to admit a letter from a person who wrote that he
owned contraband discovered in the house where Mr. Blake was residing, and Mr. Blake was not
aware of it and therefore should not have been charged with any crime relating to the discovery
of the contraband.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In December of 2018, the State charged Mr. Blake with one count of trafficking in
methamphetamine, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.30-31.) The

contraband was discovered in October of 2018, during a Probation and Parole compliance check
of the house where Mr. Blake was residing, which was owned by his father.

(R., pp.96-99;

Tr., p.30, Ls.3-12.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Blake filed a motion in limine and asked the district court to fmd
Brandon Bankston unavailable, and allow "admission into evidence at jury trial of a letter
purportedly written by" Mr. Bankston .... " (R., p.40.) In his memorandum in support of the
motion, Mr. Blake argued, "Based on Bankston's anticipated assertions of his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights, the letter is hearsay and Bankston is an unavailable witness." (R., p.43.)
Thus, he argued the letter claiming ownership of the contraband was a statement against interest
and should be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3). (R., p.43.) He also asserted that his right to
present a complete defense was "implicated by the information in the letter." (R., pp.43-44.)
The letter-which Mr. Bankston sent to his attorney from the Ada County Jail-was attached to
the memorandum. (R., pp.46-48; Tr., p.41, L.21 -p.42, L.5.)
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Mr. Bankston wrote that he was aware someone had been "arrested for a felony amount
of a controlled substance" found at Mr. Blake's father's home in Boise. (R., p.46.) He stated
that he lived at that house in September of 2018, but he was asked to leave when he did not
remain sober.

(R., p.46.) He also wrote, "I left a felony amount of methamphetamine ...

stashed around the toys 1 in the room I was staying in.

I was unable to come back to the

residence to retrieve the meth and nobody knew it was there along [with] some paraphernalia except myself."

(R., p.46.)

Mr. Bankston stated that he learned through his girlfriend that

Mr. Blake's son had been arrested for methamphetamine, and he did not believe someone else
should be held responsible for the drugs. (R., p.46.) He wrote, "Mr. Blake's son" did not have
"any knowledge of the substance being in the house because he had no access to the room it was
found in nor did he have any knowledge or control of this substance found." (R., pp.46-47.) In
closing, he stated that the homeowner "is a very good friend of mine and [I] feel it is my moral
obligation to own up for my mistakes." (R., p.47.)
Mr. Blake filed an affidavit stating that he had "learned through Bankston's counsel ...
that Bankston is withdrawing his statement, Bankston will not be interviewed by agents of the
defense or the state concerning the issue, and Bankston will not agree to testify in the
defendant's criminal case." (R., pp.50-51.) One month later, he filed supplemental arguments in
support of the motion in limine and argued that two other exceptions to the rule against hearsay
applied: I.R.E. 803(15) and I.RE. 803(24). (R., pp.64-66.)
Subsequently, the State filed an objection in which it claimed that, after he was arrested,
Mr. Blake had made statements about possibly being guilty of constructive possession,
Mr. Blake had been at the Ada County Jail at the same time as Mr. Bankston, and Mr. Blake had

1

The majority of methamphetamine was found in a "toy dinosaur." (PSI, p.35.)
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made statements to the arresting officers about other people who had access to the bedroom
being responsible for the methamphetamine, but he did not mention Mr. Bankston.

(R., pp.73-

74.) It also argued there were not sufficient corroborating circumstances that would indicate the
trustworthiness of the letter, as required by I.R.E. 804(b)(3)(B). (R., pp.72-78.) It noted that the
Idaho Supreme Court had adopted a seven-factor test to be used in considering the
trustworthiness of a hearsay statement such as Mr. Bankston's letter (R., p.75), and it argued the
test showed the letter was not trustworthy. (R., pp.76-77.) The district court then held a hearing
on the motion, at which Mr. Blake requested the district court's permission to file a reply to the
State's objection and to continue the hearing; the court granted those requests. (See generally
4/24/19 Tr.)
Mr. Blake then filed a reply and asserted that the State had not established any foundation
for its statement of facts, and thus they were not properly in front of the court. (R., p.81.) With
respect to the seven-factor test, he argued that the letter was "self-corroborating" because it
included, among other things, the "relevant time periods" and "details about where [Bankston]
secreted the drugs."

(R., p.82.)

Further, he asserted that the State had not established a

relationship existed between Mr. Blake and Mr. Bankston other than "Bankston lived in the
defendant's father's house at relevant times." (R., p.83.) He acknowledged that Mr. Bankston
had only made the statement about owning the drugs once but argued, "Bankston was provided
with conflict counsel soon after the statement was issued, and . . . counsel would advise
Bankston to not repeat the statement, assert his constitutional rights, and say no more."
(R., p.83.) Further, he argued there was no benefit to Bankston from writing the letter, and the
State's "argument concerning when Bankston and the defendant were allegedly in jail together
and what may have transpired between them is pure speculation." (R., pp.83-84.)
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The State then filed a supplemental objection to the motion in limine. (R., pp.86-89.) It
asserted that I.RE. 803(15) and I.R.E. 803(24) did not apply in this case. (R, pp.86-88.) And,
in an effort to support the factual assertions in its original objection, it submitted affidavits from
officers involved with Mr. Blake's arrest and subsequent interview, jail logs showing Mr. Blake
and Mr. Bankston had been in the same jail dorm for a short period of time, and an affidavit from
the Ada County Jail Investigator confirming that information. (R., pp.91-99.)
The district court held another hearing on May 1, 2019. At that hearing, Mr. Blake
testified that he lived at his father's house in early August of 2018 but moved out shortly
thereafter and then moved back into the house in late October. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2-17.) He also
testified that he knew Mr. Bankston because Mr. Bankston had lived in the "back bedroom" of
his father's house in the fall of 2018. (Tr., p.30, Ls.18-25.) After the parties' arguments, the
district court decided the motion. For the purpose of its analysis, it assumed Mr. Bankston was
unavailable, and Mr. Bankston later asserted his Fifth Amendment right when asked about the
methamphetamine on the stand. (Tr., p.56, Ls.2-13, p.71, L.4-p.72, L.25.)
Ultimately, the district court held that the letter did not meet the trustworthiness
requirement of I.RE. 804(b )(3) and should be excluded.

(Tr., p.55, L.24 - p.63, L.5.)

Subsequently, Mr. Blake entered a conditional Alford2 plea to one count of trafficking in
methamphetamine, which preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion in
limine. (Tr., p.75, L.8 - p.91, L.20; R., p.123.) The district court then imposed a sentence of
eight years, with three years fixed. (R, p.124.) Mr. Blake filed a notice of appeal timely from
the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.128-30.)

2

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
4

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Blake motion in limine?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Blake's Motion In Limine

A.

Introduction
Mr. Blake asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion in

limine because it failed to reach its holding that Mr. Bankston's letter did not meet the
trustworthiness requirement of I.R.E. 804(b )(3) through an exercise of reason because the district
court engaged in speculation to reach its holding, and the majority of factors at issue supported
admitting Mr. Bankston's letter so a jury could decide the case.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court's decision on a motion in limine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014). In such a review, the Court considers whether
the trial court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Blake's Motion In Limine
Because It Failed To Reach Its Decision Through An Exercise Of Reason
Every defendant

has

a

fundamental

right

to

present

a

complete

defense.

"The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239 (2009) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). "This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." Washington,
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388 U.S. at 19. It includes the right to "offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary," so that a jury can decide "where the truth lies." Id. As noted in
State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 287 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted), however, the right to

present a complete defense is balanced against the State's interests in the criminal trial process
because "the Sixth Amendment 'does not confer the right to present testimony free from the
legitimate demands of the adversarial system."' Similarly, this Court has stated that "the Rules
of Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the courts of this State," and those
rules "embody the balancing test which safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to present a
defense along with protection of the state's interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process."
Meister, 148 Idaho at 240.

Therefore, when a defendant wants to present an alternate perpetrator's out-of-court
confession, which would be considered hearsay, the confession will be admitted when it meets
the standards set forth in I.R.E. 804(b)(3). Id. at 241-42. Such a confession will be admitted if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness and "a reasonable person in the declarant's position"
would have only made the statement if the person "believed it to be true because, when made, it .
. . had so great a tendency to . . . expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability."
I.R.E. 804(b)(3)(A). If the confession is offered in a criminal case, it must be "supported by
corroborating

circumstances

that

clearly

indicate

its

trustworthiness

"

I.R.E. 804(b)(3)(8).
In Meister, this Court adopted Arizona's standard and seven-factor test for
determining trustworthiness.

148 Idaho at 243.

It stated that the test would consider

"whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant's statement
would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be true." Id. Thus,
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before admitting such a confession, trial courts apply a seven-factor test in order to determine
whether the confession is supported by corroborating circumstances that indicate its
trustworthiness. This requires trial courts to determine,
(1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether the statement is against the
declarant's interest; (3) whether corroborating circumstances exist which clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the exculpatory statement, taking into account
contradictory evidence, the relationship between the declarant and the listener,
and the relationship between the declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the
declarant has issued the statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant
amount of time has passed between the incident and the statement; (6) whether
the declarant will benefit from making the statement; and (7) whether the
psychological and physical surroundings could affect the statement.
Id. at 242 n.7.
In this case, it was undisputed that Mr. Bankston' s confession was a statement against
interest, and he was an unavailable witness.

(R., p.75.) Therefore, two of the factors that

supported admitting the letter were met, and the district court was simply required to analyze the
other five factors.

However, the court separated the third factor above into three separate

analyses. (Tr., p.57, L.20 - p.60, L. 1.)
It stated there was "no corroborating evidence to support this letter other than

Mr. Bankston's statement."

(Tr., p.57, Ls.21-22.)

It also found there was "evidence that

contradicts the letter based on the defendant's statement to the officer when he mentioned other
people but never mentioned Mr. Bankston as a possibility." (Tr., p.57, L.22 - p.58, L.1.) It went
on to say, "The letter doesn't even mention the name of his good friend, it simply mentions the
address. It is very vague." (Tr., p.58, Ls.7-9.) As such, it found that, "[T]he letter itself ...
lacks corroborating facts that could be verified either through the owner of when exactly he lived
there or the owner of the house even knows this Mr. Bankston." (Tr. p.58, Ls.16-20.)
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It found that it was "reasonable" that Mr. Bankston would send the letter to his attorney

"to have his attorney follow up." (Tr., p.59, Ls.2-10.) However, it also found there was a
relationship between Mr. Bankston and Mr. Blake because the "defendant and declarant were
cellmates ... for a short period of time," and the letter was mailed on December 6th, 2018,
''which was a day [Bankston] was in the same cell as the defendant in this case." (Tr., p.59,
Ls.15-24.)
The court noted that Mr. Bankston had not claimed responsibility for the contraband
multiple times. (Tr., p.60, Ls.2-5.) However, it acknowledged Mr. Blake's argument that it was
reasonable for Mr. Bankston not to make the statement again after consulting with an attorney,
but it said not making the statement again was "inconsistent with the letter that indicates it's his
moral obligation to own up to his own mistakes." (Tr., p.60, Ls.5-14.) It also stated that the
amount of time that had passed was "a little bit inconclusive in this case." (Tr., p.60, Ls.17-20.)
It said the fact that several months had passed was important, however, because it was "not

determinative of the facts that the State has to prove in this case which is that the defendant had
knowledge of the drugs and controlled the drugs such that he had possession of them .

,,

(Tr., p.61, Ls.2-7.)
Additionally, the court found there were no facts to support a conclusion that
Mr. Bankston would benefit from writing the letter, but it then said, "[I]t could be viewed as the
declarant gets a benefit for making a statement in cellmate' s favor even though he never has to
be subject to liability for that statement." (Tr., p.61, Ls.11-19.) Thus, it said there was "arguably
an indirect benefit from the declarant making the statement." (Tr., p.61, Ls.19-20.) Finally, it
found that psychological or physical surroundings could affect the statement due to the fact that
the two men had been in the Ada County Jail at the same time. (Tr., p.61, Ls.21-25.) Based on
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these findings, it held there were not "corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate[ d]" the
trustworthiness of the letter. (Tr., p.62, L.10- p.63, L.5.)
The district court did not reach this decision through an exercise of reason for multiple
reasons. First, the letter itself contained details that corroborated Mr. Bankston's statement. In
fact, it was not vague at all. Rather, the letter specified the address of the home, details as to
where Mr. Bankston had hidden the methamphetamine, and the fact that the home was owned by
Mr. Blake's father. (R., pp.46-47.) The district court focused on the fact that Mr. Bankston
never used the name of the homeowner in the letter, but this is not true. He identified the
homeowner as "Mr. Blake." (R., p.46.) The fact that he did not mention his first name did not
make the letter vague.
Similarly, the fact that Mr. Blake did not mention Mr. Bankston's name to one of the
arresting officers should not have been considered as contradictory evidence. Rather, as the
district court even acknowledged, Mr. Blake may have forgotten to mention his name when he
talked about people who had access to the room. (Tr., p.58, Ls.2-4.) However, the fact that he
mentioned other names supported a finding that other people, including Mr. Bankston, may have
had access to the room in question.
Moreover, evidence that Mr. Bankston and Mr. Blake were in the Ada County Jail at the
same time did not support the district court's finding that there was a "relationship" between
them. (Tr., p.59, L.15 - p.60, L.1.)

Indeed, the only actual evidence that Mr. Blake knew

Mr. Bankston was Mr. Blake's testimony that he knew him because Mr. Bankston had stayed at
his father's house.

(Tr., p.30, Ls.18-22.) Using the jail logs to speculate that there was a

relationship between the two men was not appropriate. The jail logs did not, and could not,
definitively establish that there was a relationship of any kind. Therefore, the court's fmding on
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this issue was simply guesswork. Further, the district court's reference to the two men being
"cellmates" was not proven by the jail logs. Those logs simply showed that the men "shared the
same housing unit in Dorm 4" for four days. (R., pp.92-95.) They also show that there were
multiple "bunks" in that dorm; Mr. Blake was assigned Bunk 27, and Mr. Bankston was assigned
Bunk 20. (R., pp.94-95.) While no floorplan of the dorm was submitted, these facts indicated
that there may have been as many as 30 or more bunks in the dorm. Thus, the men were not
"cellmates" as that word is traditionally understood, and the Jail Investigator's comment that it
was "very likely that the two men met" was also speculative. (R., p.92.)
Further, the fact that Mr. Bankston did not confess again is completely reasonable in light
of the fact that he spoke with his attorney soon after he made the statement and, as Mr. Blake
argued, "conflict counsel would advise Bankston not to repeat the statement, assert his
constitutional rights, and say no more."

(R., p.83.) But the district court engaged in more

speculation when, instead of limiting its analysis to the fact that there was nothing in the record
to support a finding that Mr. Bankston could benefit from writing the letter-it went on to state
that "it could be viewed as the declarant gets a benefit for making a statement in cellmate' s favor
even though he never has to be subject to liability for that statement." (Tr., p. 61, Ls.11-19.
(emphasis added).)

And it said there was "arguably an indirect benefit from the declarant

making the statement." (Tr., p.61, Ls.19-20 (emphasis added).) Again, these were guesses.
There was no proof that Mr. Bankston could benefit from writing the letter.
Similarly, there was no proof that Mr. Blake engaged in any sort of coercion or was able
to pressure Mr. Bankston to write the letter. Indeed, given the level of security at a jail, such
surroundings would likely make any behavior of this nature very difficult. Also, this finding
hinged on the prior speculative fmding that the two men had a relationship while in the jail. This
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was never proven, and there was no video surveillance admitted to show that they even spoke to
each other when they were at the jail.
In sum, many of the district court's findings were based on speculation as opposed to
facts. Indeed, the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason because
there were not enough facts in the record to establish that the letter was not trustworthy. To the
contrary, the letter was supported by corroborating circumstances that indicated its
trustworthiness, and the balance of factors supported admitting the letter. Mr. Bankston was
unavailable; the letter was a statement against his interest that contained detailed information
corroborating his statement; there was no proof that there was a relationship between Mr. Blake
and Mr. Bankston; and it was very clear that Mr. Bankston could not benefit from making such a
statement. In short, the only actual evidence in the record met the standard for trustworthiness
because that evidence would permit a reasonable person to believe the letter was true. Therefore,
under I.R.E. 804(b )(3), the letter should have been admitted so that a jury could decide the case
based on all the relevant evidence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Blake respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
his motion in limine and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2020.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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